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Sughrue and colleagues' target article “Bioethical considerations in translational research: Primate 
stroke” (2009) are to be commended for seeking to address a large gap in current bioethical 
discourse. The ethics of experimentation on nonhuman animals seems to have fallen between the 
cracks of the recent debates between clinical and research practitioners, ethicists and regulators. 
While happy to see that other parties acknowledge that this question is poorly dealt with and the 
issue remains far from closed, we have identified a number of problems with the argument 
contained in the article. In the first instance, the authors fail to clarify the sense in which they 
understand nonhuman animals as models for humans. Secondly, they ignore an important ethical 
argument, which bears directly on the case of stroke research put by philosophers whose views they 
otherwise apparently commend. And finally, throughout the article they conflate epistemological 
and ethical justifications for research without adequately justifying the assumptions that underpin 
either position. The following commentary will outline each of these criticisms, before offering 
suggestions as to how they may be met. 
Despite the existence of an extensive literature on the fundamental problems of extrapolating from 
research in animals to humans, Sughrue and colleagues (2009) appear to see model shortcomings as 
primarily a methodological issue. Four possible explanations are given for the clinical ineffectiveness 
in humans of 49 of 50 agents shown to have benefit in animal models. The first three relate to 
disparities in the timing of interventions, and the size and design in both animal-based and clinical 
trials. The final explanation offered for failed extrapolations from bench-top to bedside is that 
rodent models “do not fully represent important clinical and biological realities of human stroke” 
(Sughrue et al. 2009, 3). Sughrue and colleagues (2009) then make the assertion that “non-human 
primate brains seem better suited to accurately predict the potential for a drug to protect ischemic 
tissue in the human brain” (3). Simply put, their argument is that nonhuman primates might be more 
successful models for this type of research because the central nervous system of rats, rabbits and 
mice—unlike that of monkeys—are not sufficiently homologous to that of human beings. On this 
basis the authors claim that primate-based research should prove to be more experimentally 
productive, and hence clinically predictive than current models and methods. 
Research into model-based science has led philosophers and experimentalists alike to be wary of 
pre-emptive claims about the predictive abilities of animal models (LaFollette et al. 1993; Perel et al. 
2007). In most modeling activities, the strictness of the criteria for resemblance relations between 
the model and target system often complicates the move from model-based representation to 
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model-based predictions. A concise summary of the core epistemological issue for biomedicine is 
provided by the authors of a handbook for animal-based science who note: 
It is not possible to give reliable general rules for the validity of extrapolation from one 
species to another. This has to be assessed individually for each experiment and can often 
only be verified after first trials in the target species (Hau et al. 2003, 6). 
This means that despite their greater homology, there is no evidence to suggest that induced 
cerebrovascular events in primate models will produce accurate predictions about spontaneous 
disease in the target species (humans) until clinical trials on patients are undertaken. As recently 
demonstrated by the TGN 1412 trial (a compound which was tested on a primate model before 
phase I trials resulting in significant harms to human participants) it is only with the benefit of 
hindsight that we can know the relevant and ‘correct’ animal studies to employ. 
Sughrue and colleagues (2009) then tackle the thorny issue of the ethical justification of this type of 
research by offering a weak synthesis of the broadest deontological and utilitarian positions, 
conferring nonhuman animals limited ‘rights’ to have an ‘interest’ in avoiding harms like pain and 
death. What is absent from this discussion however, is any engagement with what has become 
known as the ‘argument from marginal cases’. Although David DeGrazia, Ray Frey, and Peter Singer 
are correctly represented as claiming that normal humans have greater interest in avoiding death 
than other animals, Sughrue and colleagues (2009) fail to disclose these ethicists' entire arguments. 
In their more fully articulated position each of these moral philosophers has argued that 
experimentation on incapacitated humans—such as encephalitic infants, brain dead adults and 
other so-called ‘marginal cases’—may be less morally problematic than experimentation on healthy 
animals. 
Sughrue and colleagues (2009) then seek to defend the expansion of primate-based research by 
attempting to demonstrate that there is likely to be a qualitative difference between the interior 
lives of human and non-human primates. Their argument rests on the claim that most of the 
suffering which results from minor strokes—whether spontaneous or surgically induced—is “due to 
the delayed intellectual and psychological reaction” (3) to the resulting incapacitation. Catastrophic 
strokes, in both humans and nonhuman animals, are portrayed as being distinct because they cause 
little to no pain or suffering. The un-stated assumption is that monkeys undergoing procedures that 
cause any form of stroke do not experience pain or suffering because by our measure, they do not 
possess similar intelligence or a capacity for abstract thought. And yet beyond the mutual 
recognition of sentience on which all human and nonhuman animal relationships depend, a 
fundamental divide separates us from the interiority, or self-reflexive inwardness of animal lives 
(Descola 2006). The philosopher Steve Sapontzis (1987, 219–220) has argued, because we have no 
access to animal experiences of existence, we have no reliable way to measure the relative quality or 
value of their subjective selves. 
In setting ethical calculations on a utilitarian scale and regarding the experimentation under 
investigation justifiable, Sughrue and colleagues (2009) have not properly weighed the burdens and 
benefits involved. It is far from clear that the experimental subjects will suffer no relevant and 
significant harms and that accounting for the primate's presumed cognitive and emotional 
capacities, and inability to predict their fate—suffering an induced stroke—adequately reflect their 
interests. Nor is it clear that given the problems of homology and the evident incapacitation of the 
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most needy patient population, that expanding the use of imperfect and inherently fallible animal 
models should be preferred when there are description-based and clinically focused epistemic 
strategies for overcoming human pathologies (Marincola, 2007). Nor is there any guarantee that a 
clinical benefit will follow for patients from these experiments, which would justify any harm to 
experimental subjects. Scientific research is a haphazard epistemic practice with intended and 
unintended outcomes. Although Sughrue and colleagues (2009) make the point, the authors appear 
unaware of the full implications of hinging the ethics of experimentation so significantly around 
therapeutic advance, noting that “stroke experiments that take care to anticipate the specific needs 
of these animals are not unethical if they lead to the development of useful therapeutics for 
humans” (3). The ‘if’ in this statement is not insignificant. While we agree that animal-based 
research can lead to medical breakthroughs, beyond the need to conform to United States Food and 
Drug Administration regulations, there seems to be little justification for subjecting healthy animals 
to bench-to-bedside experimentation when ethically and epistemologically superior strategies such 
as research based around the afflicted patient population can be undertaken. 
Throughout the article, Sughrue and colleagues (2009) seem unwittingly to run together 
epistemological and ethical arguments. This is most obvious when they make the astonishing claim 
that by building an ethical bridge which generates popular consensus on experimentation, they will 
“by extension, [have] success in curing disease”(3), i.e., that somehow solving ethical problems will 
validate their models and result in scientific advance. This simply does not follow. 
It is our opinion that Sughrue and colleagues (2009), at a minimum, should: clarify how they are 
appealing to animal models and acknowledge the predictive. limitations of claims made from 
homology (they already cite in their article a list of past methodological shortcomings and failed 
translations, the import of this could simply be drawn to the reader's attention); recognize the full 
implications of the ethical arguments they are appealing to for cases of stroke; and finally try to 
carefully separate the epistemologically based arguments from ethical ones, and if they believe the 
former are crucial to the latter, then make an explicit argument to that effect. 
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